



Ministerie van Volksgezondheid,
Welzijn en Sport

Securing the largest infrastructures with little boxes.
And we love it.

Oscar Koeroo

CISO Concern voor het Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport



 **HET
DONORREGISTER**


HOE WILT U ER IN STAAN?








What makes a connection secure?





no manipulation
encrypted
recipient is unverified





Certificate chain signing

Root CA signs Sub CA

Sub CA signs Sub CA

Sub CA signs EEC



Staat der Nederlanden EV Root CA



Staat der Nederlanden Domein Server CA 2020



QuoVadis PKIoverheid Server CA 2020



rijksoverheid.nl



rijksoverheid.nl

Issued by: QuoVadis PKIoverheid Server CA 2020

Expires: Thursday, 7 July 2022 at 13:02:00 Central European Summer Time



This certificate is valid



Where do you leave your webserver keys?


```
server {  
    listen 443 ssl http2;  
    listen [::]:443 ssl http2;  
    server_name cloud.koeroo.net;  
  
    access_log      syslog:server=unix:/dev/log,facility=local7,tag=nginx,severity=info main;  
    error_log       syslog:server=unix:/dev/log,facility=local7,tag=nginx,severity=error;  
  
    client_max_body_size 10G;  
  
    ssl_certificate      /etc/letsencrypt/live/cloud.koeroo.net/fullchain.pem;  
    ssl_certificate_key  /etc/letsencrypt/live/cloud.koeroo.net/privkey.pem;  
  
    ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on;  
    ssl_protocols       TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;  
  
    ssl_ecdh_curve       secp521r1:secp384r1:sect283k1:sect283r1:sect409k1:sect409r1:sect571k1:sect571r1;  
  
    ssl_ciphers          'ECDHE:!CAMELLIA:!AES128:!SHA1:!SHA256:!SHA384';  
  
    ssl_stapling on;  
    ssl_stapling_verify on;  
    ssl_trusted_certificate /etc/letsencrypt/live/cloud.koeroo.net/fullchain.pem;  
  
    server_tokens off;  
  
    # Headers already provided  
    add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000";
```




Hardware Security Module (HSM)


















Key features of hardware security devices

1. Crypto engine on-chip, most run Java Card
2. Key operations run on-chip: Create, delete, roll-over
3. Data handling in-chip: decryption, signing
4. Interfaces: PKCS#11, KMIP, XKMS or higher protocols (WebAuthN)
5. Certifications: FIPS140-3 or Common Criteria




FIPS140-2/3 levels

- › Level 1: basic security
- › Level 2: show evidence of tampering
- › Level 3: prevent the intruder from gaining access. Typically, adds support for multiple operational roles
- › Level 4: Penetration of the cryptographic module enclosure from any direction has a very high probability of being detected



Identity, authenticity and associated procedures combined provide a Level of Assurance







OMT: Create **two apps** for contact tracing

- Alert contacts whom you do not know and can't remember
- Support contact tracing



CoronaMelder
**Zo beschermen
we elkaar**



Ministerie van Volksgezondheid,
Welzijn en Sport



Zo werkt het coronabewijs



Open source: architecture, (crypto) analysis and code, including where all keys are stored.

The screenshot shows a GitHub repository page for 'nl-covid19-coronacheck-app-coordination' with the file 'Security Architecture.md' selected. The page has a dark theme. At the top, the breadcrumb navigation shows 'nl-covid19-coronacheck-app-coordination / architecture / Security Architecture.md'. Below this is a toolbar with buttons for 'Preview' (selected), 'Code', 'Blame', and file statistics: '299 lines (179 loc) · 25.1 KB'. There are also buttons for 'Raw', 'Copy', 'Download', 'Edit', and a menu icon. The main content area has the heading 'HSM gebruik' with a link icon. The text below the heading discusses the use of a Hardware Security Module (HSM) for data security, mentioning DCC and CTB, and states that keys are stored on a non-exportable HSM.

github.com/minvws/nl-covid19-coronacheck-app-coordination/blob/main/archite...

nl-covid19-coronacheck-app-coordination / architecture / Security Architecture.md ↑ Top

Preview Code Blame 299 lines (179 loc) · 25.1 KB Raw Copy Download Edit

HSM gebruik 🔗

Ter beveiliging van het proces om borging dat na nodige vernietiging de data niet meer terug te vinden is, ook niet in backups, zal er gebruik gemaakt worden van een Hardware Security Module voor DCC. Voor de CTB gelden voorlopig door VWS opgestelde beheermaatregelen.

In deze HSM worden de sleutels opgeslagen op een niet exporteerbare manier. Hierdoor is de HSM de enige die een geldige ondertekening op de gevraagde data kan leveren.

Wikipedia:
[Auguste Kerckhoffs](#)



*Perfect
solution?*



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